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Could US-Syrian Strategies lead to Genocide? 
Rocked by ongoing violence and protests in the Middle East and the tragic death of 
Ambassador Stevens in Libya, U.S. policy toward the region seems in crisis. Senator John 
McCain has characterized our Middle East foreign policy as “feckless,” while others have 
questioned why there appears to be widespread mistrust of U.S. intentions in the region. Syria 
represents a particularly difficult challenge for U.S. geopolitical strategists as the civil war rages 
on, with instability and the mounting deaths and displacement of innocent civilians spilling over 
to neighboring states. Is it possible that the current thrust of U.S. policy towards Syria may lead 
to a frightening genocide there, in part because of the real absence of critical geopolitical 
thinking about Syria’s culture and territory? 
 As the Arab Spring unfolded in 2011, the U.S. shifted away from its long-standing policy 
of overt and tacit support for many of the region’s dictators and strongmen. It embraced what it 
saw as change from below that could spur the development of a more inclusive democratic 
political system. Critics argued that this policy shift was simply one of convenience and 
pragmatism, given the ouster and/or death of long-time leaders from Tunisia to Egypt. As the 
Syrian revolution took flame in the streets of Aleppo, Damascus, and Homs aiming to topple the 
al-Assad regime, the U.S. lent its support to the Syrian rebels hoping to facilitate the downfall of 
the Ba’ath government.  This, in turn, could shift the balance of power in the region, ostensibly 
to the detriment of Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon.  
 Herein lies the dilemma for U.S. geopolitical strategy: trying to accommodate Syria’s 
cultural realities while supporting the ouster of President al-Assad. Political, military, and 
economic power since the 1960s rests with the minority Alawi, who number less than two 
million or about 12 percent of the country’s population. Although considered a Shi’a sect, the 
Alawi religious doctrine deviates significantly from mainstream Shi’a beliefs and the dominant 
Sunni have long viewed the Alawi with distain. Under French occupation in the early 20th 
century, the Alawi were given significant autonomy over territory in western Syria along the 
Mediterranean coast, known as the Alawite State. Today, the Alawi can be found also on the 
plains around Homs and Hama, with significant concentrations in Aleppo and Damascus.  
 The geopolitical options for U.S. policy toward Syria seem to put the U.S. in a no-win 
situation. If the U.S. continues to support the predominantly Sunni Syrian rebels, either a mass 
exodus of Alawis or revenge killings leading to potential genocide are likely. Alawi Syrians have 
been viewed by Sunnis as religious heretics and enemies for centuries, and old hatreds die hard 
as witnessed in Iraq, Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere around the world.  
 A divide-and-conquer approach to the region, perhaps hopeful of encouraging greater 
Sunni anger towards Iranian Shiites, likely would misfire and provoke more regional sectarian 
violence. Indeed, cynics argue that the U.S. only courts the region’s Sunni leaders because of oil 
and petrodollars and is more concerned about political-economic stability than democracy. 
Nonetheless, perhaps the only viable solution to the Syrian crisis is the Balkan model, with the 
partition of Syria to establish an Alawi homeland in the traditional western territory known as 
Latakia. Whatever path is chosen, Syrian innocents will continue to die in ever-increasing 
numbers unless the U.S. and international community provide a viable geopolitical option 
acceptable to both sides. An Alawi genocide would set back U.S. interests in the Middle East for 
decades and further destabilize an already fragile region.  
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